With an increasing number of applications in the context of multi-agent systems, automated negotiation is a rapidly growing area. Written by top researchers in the field, this state-of-the-art treatment of the subject explores key issues involved in the design of negotiating agents, covering strategic, heuristic, and axiomatic approaches. The authors discuss the potential benefits of automated negotiation as well as the unique challenges it poses for computer scientists and for researchers in artificial intelligence. They also consider possible applications and give readers a feel for the types of domain where automated negotiation is already being deployed.
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Preface
We all of us have to negotiate -whether formally, as part of our jobs, or informally, as part of our everyday lives -and the outcomes of our negotiations have direct and often dramatic consequences, for us and others. However, it is surely a safe bet that most of us wish we were better negotiators. There are many reasons why we might not be as good at negotiating as we would wish. For one thing, it is often hard for us to really understand the issues at stake and the consequences of various potential settlements, and for this reason we can end up with outcomes that are not as good as those that we might in fact have been able to obtain. Moreover, in many cultures, negotiation is regarded as greedy or impolite, and as a consequence, some people may find it socially awkward or stressful to negotiate. Cultural inhibitions like these can prevent us from obtaining the best outcome even when the topic of negotiation is of great importance to us. Wouldn't it be wonderful, then, if we had computers that could effectively negotiate on our behalf . . . ? In short, the main aim of this book is to investigate this idea.
The idea of computers negotiating on our behalf may sound like science fiction, but we hope to demonstrate in this book that the theory and software technology underpinning automated negotiation is sufficiently advanced and sufficiently robust that it is entirely plausible that some form of automated negotiation technologies could soon be deployed in large-scale real-world (i.e., non-laboratory) applications. However, we would be failing in our duty if we left you with the impression that you will be handing over negotiations for your next pay rise to a computer program. Reliable practical experience with automated negotiating systems is currently limited to a few restricted domains. As with any new technology, we should be appropriately cautious about the claims we make for its potential value and applications. Towards the end of the book, we give a feel for the types of domains where automated negotiation has been and may be deployed. 
There are many reasons why it would be desirable to have computers that can negotiate for us. Perhaps most importantly, computers can explore systematically and dispassionately possible outcomes that human negotiators might overlook, thereby reaching more efficient outcomes than might be obtained by humans. We discuss the potential advantages and disadvantages of automated negotiation in the main text of the book.
While the desire to ultimately have computers that can negotiate on our behalf is the primary motivation for this book, we should point out that there are many other good reasons for studying automated negotiation. First, negotiation is clearly an important activity in our lives, and indeed in the global economy. Any such activity is surely worthy of serious academic study. Second, as we hope to demonstrate, the mathematical formalisation and analysis of negotiation raises many interesting and deep scientific problems. And third, the automation of negotiation poses unique challenges for computer scientists and researchers in artificial intelligence; in addressing these challenges, we extend the range of problems that are amenable to solution by computerised techniques.
In some more detail, the aims of this book are threefold:
1. Our first aim is to show how negotiation can be modelled and analysed mathematically. The main mathematical framework we use is game theory -the theory of interactions between self-interested economic agents. Although usually thought of as a branch of micro-economics, game theory has recently been found to be of great relevance and value in the analysis of distributed computer systems in which the participant nodes cannot be assumed to share common goals, as is the case in negotiation settings. 2. Second, as the name of the book and the discussion above indicate, we aim to consider how negotiation can be automated within computer programs. One key issue here is that while we ideally seek computer programs that can determine optimal solutions to negotiation problems, in practice, it may be beyond the scope of conventional computing techniques to compute such optimal solutions (i.e., the problem may be NP-hard, or worse). In such cases, our task is to map out the border between computationally tractable negotiation problems and computationally intractable ones, and to develop alternative techniques (heuristics or approximations) that can be used to find nearly optimal solutions, or at least satisfactory solutions, for cases where they cannot be resolved using conventional techniques. 3. Third, we aim to give an indication of the kinds of applications for which automated negotiation solutions are being considered, the kinds of issues that arise when automated negotiating systems interact with people, and www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-00254-8 -Principles of Automated Negotiation Shaheen Fatima, Sarit Kraus and Michael Wooldridge Frontmatter More information Preface xv finally, how negotiation stands in relation to other related approaches to reaching agreements, such as argumentation, social choice, and fair division.
Intended readership. The main intended audience for this book is graduate computer science students and researchers in computer science/artificial intelligence who wish to understand the main challenges and state of the art in automated negotiation. However, we hope that the book will also be of interest and value to negotiation researchers from disciplines such as management and business studies, psychology, and economics: much of the most fruitful research is carried out in the intersections between different research disciplines, and automated negotiation seems to us to be a wonderful and fascinating exemplar of such interdisciplinary research.
Prerequisites. The book assumes a knowledge of computer science that would be obtained from a typical undergraduate degree in computer science, and a level of mathematical sophistication that would be consistent with such a course. With respect to the latter, the main requirements are familiarity with the basic structures of discrete mathematics, the notion of formal proof (and in particular proof by induction), the basic concepts of probability, some familiarity with series, sequences, and their sums, and ideally some understanding of basic concepts in operations research and optimisation (e.g., linear programming and related concepts).
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Games in normal form (Chapter 2)
P the set of players (i.e., the agent set) S i strategy set for Player i ∈ P S = S 1 × · · · × S |P| set of strategy profiles s ∈ S a strategy profile
|P| mixed (randomised) strategy set for Player i ∈ P W (s) social welfare of strategy profile s ∈ S Games in extensive form (Chapter 3) different information sets p probability distribution function: assigns to each x ∈ Θ 0 a probability distribution p x over the edges in x S i strategy set for Player i ∈ P S = S 1 × · · · × S |P| set of strategy profiles s ∈ S a strategy profile U i : S → R utility function for Player i ∈ P μ belief system
Task-oriented domains (Chapter 4)
Tsk set of all tasks c : 
